INTRODUCTION
Research facilities ttiat maintain large inventories of plutonium need a method for monitoring their storage vaults to detect unauthorized removal of plutonium in a timely fashion. This report describes the vault rnonitoring system, designed and constructed at Los Alamos National Laboratory and tested at Argonne National Laboratory West, that provides a reliable and inexpensive method for monitoring large storage vaults.
The vault monitoring systemn provides continuous surveillance by tneasuring changes in a vault's neutron field. These changes reflect whether plutonium has been added to or removed frorm the vault, pinpoint the location, and indicate how much plutonium is involved.
Bulk plutonium in storage vaults generally is a mixture of several isotopes. The principal source of neutrons emitted by typical metallic plutonium is 240 Pu, which fissions spontaneously at a rate of approximately 1000 n/s per gram. Thus, in a plutonium storage vault the strength of the neutron field at any place primarily depends on the mass and spatial distribution of 240 Pu. Addition or removal of plutoniurn causes changes to the neutron field that can be measured using a geometrically appropriate array of neutron detectors. (Fig. 1) at ZPPR was used to imeasure statistically significant changes in the neutron field associated with plutonium in storage. The field changed when the spatial distribution of the plutonium was disturbed. One objective of our research was to determine the smnallest amount of removed plutonium that we could detect with reasonable confidence, using a manageable number of detectors.
The 25 neutron detectors measured the neutron count rates in the vault. These count rates were compared to a set of previously acquired data. If there was no difference between data sets, we assumed that the field was the same and, hence, the geometric and mass configuration of the plutonium in storage had not changed. We rneasured differences between data sets using chi-square statistical tests.
Briefly, the nurnber of experimnental occurrences of an event (such as neutrons detected) observed in a time period Tc can be cormipared to theoretical predictions of how often the event is expected to occur in time period Tc. Let U = {u1 C POWER AND SIGNAL DISTRIBUTION PANEL } Tt-he probability that y2 < y2 is described as
The expression Pn-i(X2) is also called the probability density function of the y2 distribution with (n-I) degrees of freedom.
YO is a constant that causes the integral of Eq. (2) to be unity wnen limits of zero and infinity are used. By selecting probability thresholds, one can state that certain small differences are statistically significant, or insignificant, at a certain confidence level based cn the value calculated for x2. Thus, if 0.001 < p ( 2 2x ) < 0.999 (4) is chosen as the probability window required for a valid compn-)arison where changes in frequencies are statistically (2) insignificant, only two cornparisons per thousand will produce a3 false alarmT. A low false-alarmn rate is an important operational constraint.
Because it was desirable to cofmpare two observed sets of neutron count data that were collected over unequal countinq (3) timne periods, Fq. (l) can be modified as follows, such that )(a is calculated in term-ls of count rates and counting times: 
DATA ACQUISITION EQUIPMENT AN!D SOFTWARE
A LeCroy 3500 data acquisition systern processes data from the 25 neutron detectors (Fig. 2) . The LeCroy interfaces with scientific experiments by means of an 8-slot CAMAC minicrate. The minicrate accorni-odates standard CAMAC modules and, thus, can both acquire data froin a scientific experiment as well as control the experiment. For the ZPPR experiments, we used six Kinetic Systems 3610 hex scalers and one Kinetic Systems 3061 input gate/output register (IGOR) as the interface between the l eCroy and the experiment.
Data acquisition and processing took place as follows. Original 3He(n,p) reaction pulses frorm each detector passed through a set of separate signal-conditioning electronics that converted them to standard TTL pulses. These logic pulses were fed to the 25 separate counters, housed in five Kinetic Systems 3610 hex scalers, whose counting times were controlled by a single input gate/output register. The LeCroy controlled the scalers via an eight-slot CAMAC minicrate that interfaced with the systern bus, the Multibus. A 1.000-kHz crystal-controlled signal was directed to an additional counter to provide accurate timing for processing the neutron signals. Information pertaining to neutron counts and count rates could then be acquired and analyzed by application programs written for the LeCroy.
Two such applications programs were written to acquire and process count data from the 25 neutron detectors. The VAULT program processed data from removal experiments; the Vl ONG program processed data frorn stability experimnents. Additional application programs were developed to process previously acquired data. Program VALJLT acquired data for removal experiments in which certain amounts of plutonium were remnoved from known locations in the vault. Measurements of the neutron field were made before and after the removals. Program VLONG-acquired data for stability experiments, which ran over long periods of time when no activity occurred in the vault. These experiments identified long-termn drifts or stability of the equiprnent used to collect and process the data. The ZPPR measurements included 82 stability experiments, a few of which ran for more than a week, and 16 rernoval experiments.
The results of one such stability experiment, which ran overnight on December 1-2, 1980, are shown in Fig. 3 . Total count rate adjusted to remove the effects of one unstable detector, is plotted versus time. Because no activity occurred in the vault during the time of these measurements, the fluctuations in count rate were expected to be statistical in nature if all systematic causes have been eliminated. The figure shows an average count rate of 49 030 counts/s with a fluctuation from average of about ±20 counts/s. This is a count rate stability of ±0.04%, a close approximation to the expected fluctuation pattern for purely statistical fluctuations. The low values at the beginning and end of the figure are caused by neutrons escaping from the vault when the door was open. This stability study began shortly before the vault was closed for the night and ended the next day after it was reopened.
Sixteen direct measurements of plutonium removal were performed during the 8 months the monitoring system was installed in the ZPPR vault. We discovered that small distortions in the neutron field could be detected. Such distortions were caused by persons moving in the vault; the vault door being open; or removed material being too close, less than 3 m, to the vault entrance. Thus, all measurements were made with no one in the vault, the door closed, and all removed material stored about 10 m away and shielded by concrete during measurement of the neutron field.
Results of the December 2 removal experiment appear in Measurements of typical canisters of 26% 240Pu and II% 240 PU indicate that the 26% material emits 2.5 as rnany neutrons as the II% material. Thus, the change in count rate ACR per kilogram of 11% 240Pu can be computed from the 26% 240Pu data. A field distortion parameter K = X 2/ACR that indicates a change in the shape of the neutron field is also tabulated in Table II . K appears to be approximately 6 at the top storage cell and less than 3 at other levels.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
The neutron monitoring experiments conducted at ZPPR successfully demonstrated the feasibility of using 3He
proportional counters to measure the neutron field in a plutonium storage vault. During the experiments, count rate stability at the ±0.04 to ±0.05% level was maintained for extended periods of time. A removal sensitivity of about 1 kg of plutonium from a nominal vault inventory of 2500 kg was achieved. This sensitivity applies to removal from any storage cell in the vault and is based on 4000-s counting periods. Statistically, for this situation, we had predicted a false-alarm rate with a I-kg trip level to result in one false alarrn per 2 years of continuous rnonitoring. The 8-month vault monitoring experience at ZPPR indicates that, with only modest hardware improvements, this level can be achieved.
Our findings indicate that the removal sensitivity for the top cells differs significantly from the removal sensitivity for all other cells. This is to be expected for spatially peaked distributions because the corresponding x2 values weight the individual detector excursions as the square of the excursion, which leads to a much larger x2 for a given change in total count rate if that change occurs primarily in a few detectors instead of in many.
The practical import of the foregoing observation is that a change in system count rate can be attributed to a removal from a given cell level in the cubicle, using the observed field distortion parameter. With this information, one may then accurately interpret a given change in count rate in terms of a rnissing plutonium mass.
ELAPSED TIME (min) For example, a change in count rate of 40 counts/s corresponds to a removal of 2 kg of plutonium if K is about 3, but corresponds to a removal of 1 kg of plutonium if K > 6. The ability to interpret count rate changes in terms of the field distortion parameter makes it possible to use neutron monitoring for vault inventory purposes. based on our measurements, we predict that the vault mnonitoring systern can provide surveillance of a 2500-kg plutonium inventory in real tirme at a sensitivity level of ±l kg of plutonium. 
